Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. The good news is that broader and more creative use of the new ID technologies could enable coalition forces to achieve dramatic victories in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) by targeting directly and effectively a critical requirement of most insurgencies: the insurgents'
pose, not only to the immediate safety of the American people, but to the broader ends of America's national security strategy, core interests, and fundamental values.
The New ID Technologies -Emerging Capabilities Leading to Staggering Possibilities
A few years ago, a U.S. Air Force general boldly predicted: "In the first quarter of the 21 st century [we] will be able to find, fix or track and target in near real-time anything of consequence that moves or is located on the face of the Earth."
2 That prediction is rapidly coming true through the combination of new identification technologies with other information technologies, such as micro-processing and data storage, sensors, global positioning systems (GPS), and new software tools and techniques, such as data mining and link analysis. The strategic and social ramifications of this emerging capability merit considerably more attention than they have received.
The most significant of the new ID technologies are biometrics and radio frequency identification (RFID).
Biometrics measures an individual's unique distinguishing physical characteristics, reduces them to digital data, and then compares them in "one-to-one" matching with those measurements in templates previously recorded in a database. The most mature biometric technologies involve fingerprint, iris, hand geometry, face, and voice recognition. 3 Although named by MIT Technology Review as one of the "top 10 emerging technologies that will change the world," 4 biometrics is not entirely new; the ancient Chinese used fingerprints to authenticate property deeds, and the early Egyptians used them to authenticate pottery.
5
Especially since the late 1990s, dropping data storage costs have enabled biometrics' reemergence in several, primarily governmental and military applications, including force protection, access control, workforce maintenance, and detention center monitoring. The use of biometrics also is increasingly common in the marketplace, where, for example, millions of
Americans can now cash checks, buy gas, or purchase groceries with a touch of their finger at thousands of retailers across the United States.
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As a leader in the development of biometrics, the United States is in a good position to leverage its application to the GWOT. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2001 listed biometrics as among the most promising emerging technologies that DoD plans vigorously to develop and exploit "for tracking adversaries and providing secure authentication of individuals seeking network or facility access." 7 In fact, biometric techniques provide the technical underpinning for large-scale civil status and identity "smart "card projects now being pursued around the world 8 and may be incorporated in the de facto national ID card for the United States mandated in the Real ID Act of 2005.
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A new, biometrics-based national identity "Multipurpose Access Card" proposed for the citizens of Iraq would link to a central database tied to various existing Iraqi governmental databases, and would be used for such purposes as vetting, checkpoints, access control, forgery detection, detainee security, decentralized verification and entitlements. 10 A similar project aiming at using a biometrics-based identification card for purposes of force protection should be available to coalition forces by December 2006.
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The United States already is compiling biometric measurements of local workers and terrorism suspects in Afghanistan, in the streets of Iraq, and at our incarceration facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, using the Biometric Automated Toolset developed by the Battle
Command Battle Laboratory at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona. DoD's Automated Biometric Identification System allows this biometric information to be compared with that contained in the world's largest biometrics database, located at the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System facility located in Clarksburg, West
Virginia. 12 The potential of this technology increases exponentially when combined with RFID technology. Like biometrics, RFID is not entirely new; it was used during World War II in "Identification Friend or Foe" (IFF) systems to differentiate between friendly and hostile aircraft.
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RFID transponders, or "tags," consist of a computer chip and a micro-antenna. These can be embedded directly in an item or in a tiny plastic attachment and configured to lie passive until passing within activation range of a compatible reader/scanner. At that point, the tag silently beams its Electronic Product Code (EPC), and any other information it was programmed to relay, back to the reader for processing. Direct line of sight is not required. A battery-operated, active version also is available, including one using a printed battery less than a millimeter thick. 14 The maximum operating range between tags and readers is limited and depends on many factors, including the radio frequency being used, the amount of power emitted by the reader, and the degree of radio interference in the vicinity. Passive tags are readable within only a few meters. Active versions provide dramatically increased range, typically up to dozens of meters.
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Unlike the now-common barcode, which identifies stock-keeping units only, RFID tags allow identification of specific items. The 96-bit EPC can allow discrete IDs for 2 96 different objects, equivalent to 80,000 trillion trillion objects, more than enough for every man-made object in existence. 16 Many of the largest consumer product manufacturers in the world have already entered into RFID contracts and are working toward interoperability, driving the cost of producing RFID tags down toward the industry goal of a few cents apiece. 17 In Low cost RFID, in combination with low cost data storage, could allow RFIDs to be placed on a vast number of objects, opening the way to "pervasive computing" (also known as "ubiquitous computing"), in which computers would become integrated into the environment, animating otherwise inert objects. 20 This "embodied virtuality" will allow for greater humancomputer and computer-computer interaction. It will also allow for an "Internet of objects," in which, as ludicrous as it may sound, "a can of beans will come with its own individual webpage…"
21
The ability to track individual items using RFID will likely improve every link in the supply chain--perhaps even dramatically--from manufacturing to retail distribution and even disposal.
RFID could eliminate most inventory theft or loss, provide better shelf-life monitoring, assist in product recalls, promote "just-in-time" inventory management, secure baggage handling, identify discarded parts for salvaging, and help to achieve a variety of other efficiencies. The introduction of networked RFID readers in the home (in the form of "smart " appliances, furniture, medicine cabinets, ceiling tiles, etc.), would allow for the monitoring of food, medicines, belongings …and even occupants, for purposes such as care-giving. 22 Some privacy advocates fear this capability could be abused for purposes of marketing or coercive government control.
RFID already is the enabling technology behind "smart tags" at toll booths, "speed passes" at gas stations, and tracking tags on millions of pets …but this is just a hint of its potential. As Accenture puts it: "Almost any physical item can be embedded with electronic tags and sensors to establish a unique and verifiable identity, store a wealth of information, and sense changes in the environment."
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For example, RFID tags can combine with a whole class of tiny, networked, wireless sensors, called "smart dust" and "motes," to monitor heat, light, movement and other environmental factors. Motes are already being used in transportation and viticulture. Using microelectromechanical systems for locomotion, and distributed intelligence to produce "swarm behavior" similar to the collective behavior of insect colonies, a meshed "colony" of lowobservable motes could share magnetometer information, peer-to-peer, in order to provide early warning of an advancing tank column or a possible ambush. Sown in a future battlespace by the thousands, at a cost of only about $1 apiece, they would be too numerous to destroy and, at perhaps the size of a grain of sand, too small to notice. Deriving their power from sunlight, vibrations, or perhaps just a coating of radioactive isotopes, they could have greater longevity than humans. Their military missions could include such things as sniffing out deadly toxins, hunting missiles, or monitoring treaty compliance.
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With the emerging ability to tag nearly everything with its own unique identifier and to track it using RFID, the possibilities for vastly expanded surveillance are staggering. So, too, though, would be the concomitant amounts of storage required to retain the data generated. Then there is the matter of developing software sophisticated enough to sort through what would amount to a series of massive, global databases, in order to find those proverbial "needles" in the "haystack."
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Thanks to the plunging cost of data storage, a number of huge databases already exist or are under development. In fact, in 2004 the world's largest database was owned by Wal-Mart and already contained more than twice as much data as the entire Internet combined. 26 Some observers estimate that the world's storage of data roughly doubles in quantity every year.
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Sophisticated data analysis tools now offer the ability to sort quickly through mountains of data and to tie disparate data to individuals using the new forensics attribution capability made possible by biometrics and RFID. Commonly referred to as "data mining," these are actually part of a larger process known as "knowledge discovery in databases" or KDD, which examines relationships among data using a variety of parameters, including association, sequence or path analysis, classification, clustering, and forecasting.
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A now-disbanded military intelligence unit code-named "Able Danger" reportedly used KDD techniques to identify terror suspects (including four of the 9/11 hijackers) operating in the Despite the present turmoil, many remain optimistic that the global diffusion of knowledge at the heart of globalization will eventually lead to a "richer, healthier, safer, more educated, and more stable world…," If the defining anxiety of the Cold War was fear of annihilation from an enemy you knew all too well in a world struggle that was fixed and stable, the defining anxiety in globalization is fear of rapid change from an enemy you can't see, touch or feel-a sense that your job, community or workplace can be changed at any moment by anonymous economic and technological forces that are anything but stable.
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The fear of "anonymous forces" became less nebulous on the tragic morning of In self-defense, the United States adopted a policy the Bush Administration has euphemistically termed "preemptive war," but which, in fact, amounts to preventive war. It is a strategy with which many Americans and our allies are uncomfortable, but as President Bush has stated: "History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act." Positive identification is critical to the main tactics for containing pandemics, which consist of case-finding, quarantine, contact tracing, and close control of border chokepoints.
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Taiwan and Singapore already are using RFID chips to control SARS by tracking everyone who comes into contact with SARS patients.
44
Because secure borders are essential to guarding against pandemic and international Today, the international community has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war…. The United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.
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The goals of U.S. national security strategy are "to help make the world not just safer but better," and include "political and economic freedom" and "respect for human dignity." These are worthy goals, based--as the overview of the strategy asserts--"on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests." 48 The strategy argues from American first principles, as enshrined in our Declaration of Independence and protected in our Constitution:
In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. Fathers and mothers in all societies want their children to be educated and to live free from poverty and violence. No people on earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.
America must stand for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property. The defeat of terror is a worthy and necessary goal in its own right. But ridding the world of terrorism is essential to a broader purpose. We strive to build an international order where more countries and peoples are integrated into a world consistent with the interests and values we share with our partners-values such as human dignity, rule of law, respect for individual liberties, open and free economies, and religious tolerance. We understand that a world in which these values are embraced as standards, not exceptions, will be the best antidote to the spread of terrorism. This is a world we must build today.
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In short, the broader purpose of the U.S. national strategy for combating terrorism is to create conditions necessary for a world consistent with the interests and values we share as Americans. Moreover, wider acceptance of those values will help to prevent future acts of terrorism.
How to reconcile those interests and values with the imperative to bend every element of national power in their defense is the central paradox of the GWOT. It is also the point of departure between the proponents and opponents of the new ID technologies.
The conflict over the uses of identification is an identity conflict in the larger sense, for the supporters of the technologies see them, inter alia , as useful means to the important end of securing the United States against potentially cataclysmic attacks, while the opponents of the technologies fear they will subvert the very interests and values at the core of all we seek to defend.
The Ways: Know the Enemy and Know Yourself
In some ways, our strategy for combating terror will say as much about us as it does about the enemy. The Chinese strategist Sun Tzu's oft-quoted dictum "know the enemy and know yourself" 51 is as valid today as it was 2500 years ago. We need to "shape" the enemy while understanding our own character, with all its strengths and weaknesses. 58 We should recognize that the GWOT is, in the long run, a war of ideas. We also should recognize that every war of ideas is a long run, indeed. Whether we regard ideology as the enemy's COG or a critical vulnerability, we need to de-legitimize terrorism in order to dry up the state and private support of those who use it as a tactic. Yet, it is very difficult to destroy an idea, and the question remains whether, in waging such a war, we can win quickly and decisively enough to protect ourselves from the terrorist use of WMD. We are unlikely to stamp out al-Qaeda-much less terrorism as a tactic-any time soon. Although embracing absolutist and particularistic values often directly antithetical to those generally promoted through globalization, al-Qaeda and other extremist groups have proven adept at using the anonymity afforded by the Internet in order to establish on-line "emirates" 59 that facilitate recruitment, linkage with like-minded organizations, and dissemination of their views. As long as the United
States remains the world's most puissant nation, Christian in heritage, allied with Israel, and a champion of tolerance, pluralism, and gender equality, it is probable that some Islamist extremists will link together with a view to waging jihad against it, the arguments of orthodox religious leaders notwithstanding. Even if the war of ideas goes well and the number of terrorists dwindles, there would be little comfort in knowing that a terrorist organization in possession of WMD has a membership numbered in the hundreds rather than the thousands.
Moreover, we have not been faring so well in the war of ideas. Our government's explicit doctrine of preemptive war, its policies regarding incarceration of "illegal combatants," the tactics used at Abu Ghraib prison, the "extraordinary rendition" of prisoners to other countries, the Patriot Act's expanded police powers (including national security letters, "sneak and peek" search warrants, and roving wiretaps), the revelation of domestic spying by the National Security Agency, and the subpoena of Internet browsers continue to raise questions among some about the compatibility of American values and "nonnegotiable demands of human dignity" with the manner by which the U.S. Government is prosecuting the GWOT.
Setting aside the merits of the individual issues, i t is an irony that, while our government follows a strategy in Iraq designed to isolate the enemy politically, some of its tactics have tended to weaken abroad the support of our coalition partners and to alienate at home the support of the American people. They also have tended to diminish the attractiveness in the Islamic world of the American way of life as a model for emulation and as a yardstick against which to measure the conduct of our enemy.
Although isolating the enemy politically is a fundamentally valid approach, toward which we have made some progress, it would be far more effective if we could isolate him physically.
Until now, we have been unable to do so because of the enemy's anonymity.
Anonymity is an oft-overlooked but critical requirement for most insurgencies. The characteristic of anonymity is arguably the true center of gravity for most insurgencies, as it is typically the leading source of the insurgents' power and their ability to maneuver.
Anonymity allows the insurgent to attack unexpectedly, to hide after striking, and to escape punishment, like a serial killer who masks his murderous persona with banality.
Anonymity confers on him the illusion of ubiquity. Because he can appear anywhere and yet is nowhere to be found, he can strike with near-impunity, which greatly enhances his essential capability to intimidate. It is small wonder, then, that today --as with the Viet Cong a generation ago --our enemies prefer to cloak themselves in anonymity, even at the risk of forfeiting their legal combatant status. 60 In fact, many insurgents may choose terrorist tactics in preference to conventional operations precisely for fear of disclosing their true identities.
All of our range, speed, maneuverability, stealth, precision, firepower and willpower avail us naught if we do not know the identity of our enemy and his location. Were we able to pierce the enemy's veil of anonymity, to know his identity and to trace his location, we could swiftly defeat him. The new identification technologies might offer us those means.
The Means -Securing the Battlespace by Leveraging Information Dominance
A suicide bomber intent on achieving his version of martyrdom may not be capable of being deterred; with sufficient actionable intelligence, however, he can be stopped. Conversely, "knowing that the event can be traced to its planner and executor … can create strong inhibitions in those that are not personally suicidal." 61 The means to achieve these early warning and forensic attribution capabilities could soon be multiplied greatly by using the new ID technologies in a variety of ways.
Perhaps the most effective way is through the combined use of a biometrics-based national identity card system, pervasive computing (using RFID and KDD), and more traditional investigative "skip-tracing" techniques. This would constitute probably the purest example of a "System of Systems Analysis" approach ever attempted in warfare, using "networks to fight networks." The decision whether and when to raid the factory and/or arrest the suspect is part of the commander's operational art. He will need to design non-linear Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) focused against the enemy's nodes and links and to choose the decisive point at which to attack using synchronized, discriminate, and proportionate force or other measures. 63 The operations would seek to peel back the enemy's nodes and links, exposing sub-nodes and sublinks for further exploitation after the measurement of effects and the appropriate re-alignment of resources.
The commander would do well to wait. This would allow him to map out the enemy's entire shape, using his scalable constellation of RFID readers and other sensors to detect and record more and more links among an ever-expanding network of nodes. The delay also would allow his staff time to use KDD tools to drill down deeper into archived data, in order to identify additional target sets, build legal cases for prosecution, and develop planning sequels for RDOs designed to roll up the enemy network with minimal risk to noncombatants.
This strategy would allow us to sort the insurgent out from the general population or, at the very least, cause him to take evasive measures tending to isolate him from society and commerce. It is an electronic version of the blockhouse and wire fence strategy used by the English in the Second Boer War and the quadrillage system used by the French to win the Battle of Algiers in 1957. It would enable us to isolate the enemy and force him to move like a "roving bandit," susceptible to capture at every identification chokepoint, whether it be a local dragnet, a turnstile, a grocery checkout counter, or an RFID reader hidden along a road.
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Because this will be the first such application of the new ID technologies, great surprise is achievable. Opposing forces literally will not know what hit them, except that they somehow were tipped off to the authorities. Until they understand and take countermeasures against the technologies, it will be possible to use the waves of arrests to stay within the enemy's decision cycle, or "OODA loop," 65 sowing distrust and disunity in their ranks through "epistemological,"
"neo-cortical warfare" 66 tactics such as bond-relationship targeting.
Such an operation would be a watershed for netcentric warfare -the transition of information dominance from force multiplier to new capability. 67 It would serve as a prime example of netwar, truly akin to playing the oriental game of Go with full visibility of all of the stones, while one's own are screened from the adversary's view.
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The foregoing scenario is not far-fetched. There are other possibilities, as well. For example, strewn among the rocks beside a goat trail in Waziristan, movement-sensing smart dust could trigger surveillance overflights or alert rapid response teams. The dropping cost of RFID technology and data storage should make such scenarios possible in a few short years.
The Defense Science Board Task Force on Identification Technologies would like to speed the process. Last year, it advised Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to fast-track these technologies, because winning the GWOT would require "a 'Manhattan Project'-like tagging, tracking, and locating" program for potential security threats.
69

Risk -The Potentially Prohibitive Costs of Unintended Consequences
The success of the Manhattan Project radically changed the operational environment.
Before launching a program of comparable scope in the area of identification technologies, it would prudent to weigh the possible second-and third-order consequences.
As the National Defense Strategy notes, some objectives, though desirable, may not be attainable, while others, though attainable, may not be worth the costs. 70 Are the powerful, new ID technologies desirable but not attainable? Can these or any technologies really provide a "silver bullet" for the GWOT, or would their adoption by DoD only validate the criticism that it is unable to shift from a netcentric to a culture-centric warfighting paradigm? 71 Conversely, are the technologies attainable but not worth the costs? The costs need to be weighed very carefully, especially since the same technology could, and almost certainly would, be used in the United
States, for and against American citizens.
In United States v. Olmstead 72 in 1928, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis' dissent referred to "the right to be let alone" as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." It is difficult to see how a system of surveillance as pervasive and invasive as that created through the use of these technologies can be anything but inimical to this right.
Yet some feel that encryption and other technologies will moderate many of the risks to privacy. There are even those who suggest that more distributed inverse surveillance of authority figures, or "sousveillance" (watching from below), can serve as a counter to panoptic surveillance and a check on abuses of authority, as in the case of a citizen's 1991 videotaping of Rodney King's beating by Los Angeles police. Already the wide use of camera phones may enable citizens to conduct more effective neighborhood watch systems. Some observers point to this as an early version of the "equiveillance," or harmonious balance between surveillance and sousveillance, that pervasive computing and worn (or implanted) computers will bring to society. Privacy is sacrificed but greater transparency is achieved, leading to better accountability and a purer form of democracy.
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A futurist recently lecturing at the Army War College 74 may have been thinking of equiveillance when he enthused that globalization is carrying us toward "a free society with civil liberties safeguarded by everybody watching everybody else--a panopticon." Perhaps he had forgotten that the panopticon devised by philosopher Jeremy Bentham was far from a free society. It was, in fact, a prison designed to mold behavior through the use of pervasive surveillance.
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Justice Brandeis also warned: "Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent…. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." 76 Especially by using the Social Security number as a de facto identification number--contrary to numerous assurances 77 --the federal government for many years has incrementally expanded its power to compel sharing of personal information, always citing favorable political transaction costs to the public (e.g., "this measure will reduce welfare fraud, crack down on illegal immigration, penalize deadbeat dads, etc."). The new ID technologies seem to promise even greater benefits. With the ability to track virtually everyone and everything, governments may be poised to strengthen their ability to exercise sovereignty by defeating terrorism, reducing crime, preventing money laundering, verifying entitlements, and creating secure--perhaps almost seamless--border crossings.
The market, too, will operate more efficiently, achieve greater integration, and possibly even transition to a cashless society. This degree of integration and interoperability will imply supranational organization and regulation, raising the question whether a world integrated enough to accept one universally interoperable card might be a short step from a single world government-a long-cherished dream to some but anathema to others.
Although many people believe that only "bad guys" need fear national IDs or other ID technology, privacy advocates and libertarians on both ends of the political spectrum are alarmed. Few see world government as imminent, but all distrust government, however benevolent its stated intentions. Of course, it is because America's Founding Fathers shared that fundamental distrust that they chose to predicate our Constitutional system of "checks and balances" on the idea that government is a necessary evil that must be limited. At a minimum, uncertainty regarding governments' uses of personal information fosters anxiety and Many fundamentalist Christians share a conviction that RFID technology will migrate from smart cards to subcutaneous implants (voluntary at first but later mandatory), and that these implanted chips will correspond in Biblical prophecy to "the mark of the Beast" in Revelation 13:16-17. 80 Some believe that the sinister number '666,' signifying the prophesied "number of the Beast" of Revelation 13:18, 81 already is encoded in UPC codes. 82 Those who refuse the chip will be regarded with deep suspicion and will experience persecution--the "Great
Tribulation"--having been effectively locked outside the world economy.
It would be easier to dismiss these apocalyptic fears as paranoid were it not for the fact We could undermine our own strategic center of gravity --the national will -if we adopt an approach to prosecuting the war that will lead more Americans to feel alienated from their own government.
Recognizing the new ID technologies as a potent weapon, but also as a new category of vulnerability, we must develop new safeguards to protect consumer and personal privacy before it is too late. The first step is to recognize and confront the issues. Commission, should devise an interagency process to introduce privacy standards as well as to protect against overly intrusive security practices by federal agencies.
It may well be that we shall need to make trade-offs at the expense of privacy for the sake of security, but that line should be drawn by our elected representatives after full and informed debate. Especially while it is prosecuting a war, the Executive branch of government cannot be relied upon alone to serve as a sufficient check on its own powers. lobbying by other members has succeeded in stymieing them, usually by arguing against "premature" restrictions on an infant industry before any real harms have been demonstrated.
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Those arguments notwithstanding, this is precisely the time that standards should be legislated, with the understanding that they likely will need adjusting over time. As Paula J.
Bruening of the Center for Democracy and Technology put it in congressional testimony:
[I]t is more effective and efficient to begin at the outset of the development process to create a culture of privacy that incorporates sound technical protections for privacy and that establishes the key business and public policy decisions for respecting privacy in RFID use before RFID is deployed, rather than building in privacy after a scandal or controversy erupts publicly.
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Today, civilization faces implacable enemies of proven ruthlessness and resourcefulness, against which the new identification technologies may constitute a particularly potent weapon.
Yet, will the technology fulfill our brightest hopes or realize our darkest fears, instead? Will knowledge so pervasive lead man toward Socratic virtue or, alternately, to Sophoclean hubris?
Perhaps Vaclav Havel was right to say that globalization is morally neutral; it can be good or bad, depending on the kind of content we give to it. 93 In view of the stakes, we need to choose that content wisely. America's elected leaders, in particular, need to assess the feasibility and suitability of these technologies, and, thus informed, debate the acceptability of their various uses in American society. American society needs to recognize and mitigate their inherent risks now, lest we soon discover that, in the process of targeting our enemies' identities, we have sacrificed our own. 
